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SAVING FACE: THE BENEFITS OF NOT 
SAYING I’M SORRY 
BRENT T. WHITE* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Nearly every day some public figure—from Don Imus1 to John McCain2 to 
Miss America3—offers, or is called upon to offer, an apology. But it’s not just in 
politics and Hollywood that apology reigns. Apology fever is everywhere. At 
your local bookstore, you can buy any number of recent self-help books 
espousing the benefits of apology and teaching you how to say the magic 
words.4 Or, if you prefer, a number of new Internet ventures offer workshops 
designed to teach you, or your employees, to apologize.5 If you haven’t heard, 
it’s good for warding off lawsuits.6 It’s good for business too. So good, in fact, 
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 1.  See Talk-Radio Host Don Imus Apologizes for On-Air Racial Slurs Against Rutgers Women’s 
Basketball Team, FOXNEWS.COM, Apr. 6, 2007, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,264646,00.html 
(discussing Imus’s apology following his on-air use of racial slurs). 
 2.  See M. Broder, McCain Says He Erred on Iraq Security, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/07/washington/07mccain.html (discussing McCain’s apology for saying 
that American lives had been “wasted” in Iraq). 
 3.  See US Beauty Queen to Keep Her Title, BBC NEWS, Dec. 19, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6188537.stm (reporting that Donald Trump decided to allow 
Miss USA to keep her crown after she apologized for underage drinking). 
 4. See, e.g., BEVERLY ENGEL, THE POWER OF APOLOGY: HEALING STEPS TO TRANSFORM ALL 
YOUR RELATIONSHIPS (2001) (examining the beneficial effects of giving and receiving apologies); 
GARY CHAPMAN & JENNIFER THOMAS, THE FIVE LANGUAGES OF APOLOGY: HOW TO EXPERIENCE 
HEALING IN ALL YOUR RELATIONSHIPS (2006) (describing five different kinds of apology and the 
people who use each one); KEN BLANCHARD & MARGRET MCBRIDE, THE ONE MINUTE APOLOGY: 
A POWERFUL WAY TO MAKE THINGS BETTER (2003) (examining apologies in a managerial or 
business context); MICHAEL S. WOODS, M.D., HEALING WORDS: THE POWER OF APOLOGY IN 
MEDICINE (2004) (examining apologies and their effects on medical doctors and patients). 
 5. Sorry Works!, http://www.sorryworks.net/about.phtml (last visited Oct. 4, 2008) (claiming that 
the “Sorry Works! Coalition” has quickly become the nation’s leading advocacy organization for 
disclosure, apology (when appropriate), and upfront compensation (when necessary) after adverse 
medical events.”); Partnerships for Patient Safety, http://www.p4ps.org/workshops.asp (last visited Oct. 
4, 2008) (offering workshops to doctors on “Disclosure, Apology and Forgiveness”); World Health 
Organization, Seeing Your Way Clear to Apology and Disclosure (June 6, 2007), available at 
http://www.who.int/patientsafety/events/media/disclosure_brochure.pdf (offering a conference focused 
on making “blame, silence, and denial a thing of the past”). 
 6. See Laura Landro, The Informed Patient: Doctors Learn to Say “I’m Sorry”—Patients’ Stories 
of Hospital Errors Serve to Teach Staff, WALL ST. J., Jan. 24, 2007; at D5 (discussing a “When Things 
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that at least one commercial airline employs a full-time “apology officer” whose 
sole job is to craft apologies to deliver to disgruntled customers.7 
Legal academia has caught the fever too. In a span of just a few years, law 
reviews have published a slew of articles extolling the value of apology as a 
means of resolving conflict and healing victims.8 I’ve written one myself, arguing 
courts should order public officials to apologize as a civil-rights remedy.9 
But I’ve grown uneasy that I, and others, have missed something in our 
praise of apology. And it’s not, as some suggest, that the apparent spike in 
public acts of contrition cheapens apology10—though I do admit to a bit of 
apology fatigue. Nor is it that strategic apologies are insincere—as sometimes 
an insincere apology will do.11 Rather, it’s that inadequate attention has been 
paid to developing a nuanced understanding of resistance to apology and how 
such an understanding might caution against efforts to promote apology as the 
solution to individual and societal conflict. 
 
Go Wrong: Voice of Patients and Families” training program financed in large part by Crico/RMF, a 
medical-malpractice company, which teaches doctors to apologize); see also, Peter Geier, Emerging 
Med-Mal Strategy: “I’m Sorry,” NAT’L L.J., July 14, 2006 (noting a drop in claims against the University 
of Michigan despite an increase in hospital activity every year after implementing the Sorry Works! 
Program). 
 7. Jeff Bailey, Airlines Learn to Fly on a Wing and an Apology, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2007, 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/18/business/18sorry.html. 
 8. See, e.g., Jayne W. Barnard, Reintegrative Shaming in Corporate Sentencing, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 
959 (1999) (offering procedures that shame offenders to prevent future corporate- and white-collar 
crimes); Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal 
Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85 (2004) (describing the proper use of apology in everyday life and 
articulating reasons for including apology in criminal law); Max Bolstad, Learning from Japan: The 
Case for Increased Use of Apology in Mediation, 48 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 545 (2000) (contrasting the 
American and Japanese uses and effects of apologies); Elizabeth Latif, Note, Apologetic Justice: 
Evaluating Apologies Tailored Toward Legal Solutions, 81 B.U. L. REV. 289, 296–98 (2001) (noting 
several cases in which judges have ordered offenders to deliver public apologies); Deborah L. Levi, 
Note, The Role of Apology in Mediation, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1165 (1997) (suggesting an apology during 
mediation might empower the injured party, and it might heal them as well); see Jeffrey Berryman, 
Reconceptualizing Aggravated Damages: Recognizing the Dignitary Interest and Referential Loss, 41 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1521, 1549–50 (2004) (considering punitive damages as a means for compensating 
for lost or hurt dignity); Jonathan R. Cohen, Legislating Apology: The Pros and Cons, 70 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 819, 820 (2002) (listing states that have or are considering barring apology evidence); Aviva 
Orenstein, Apology Excepted: Incorporating a Feminist Analysis into Evidence Policy Where You 
Would Least Expect It, 28 SW. U. L. REV. 221 (1999) (supporting an apology exception for evidence 
that accounts for feminist views of apologies); Jennifer K. Robbennolt, Apologies and Legal Settlement: 
An Empirical Examination, 102 MICH. L. REV. 460, 463 (2003) (suggesting that apologies encourage 
legal settlement); Daniel W. Shuman, The Role of Apology in Tort Law, 83 JUDICATURE 180, 187 
(2000) (telling of judges who shamed convicts as a means of deterrence by ordering them to publicly 
apologize). 
 9. Brent T. White, Say You’re Sorry: Court-Ordered Apologies as a Civil Rights Remedy, 91 
CORNELL L. REV. 1261, 1261 (2006). 
 10. See Lee Taft, Apology Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135, 1138 
(2000) (arguing the “strategic” use of apology to facilitate dispute resolution may undermine the moral 
quality of apology). 
 11. See White, supra note 9, at 1295. 
20_WHITE_CONTRACT PROOF.DOC 8/28/2009  1:44:51 PM 
Spring 2009] THE BENEFITS OF NOT SAYING I’M SORRY 263 
Roger Conner and Patricia Jordan’s account of resistance to apology in 
Never Being Able to Say You’re Sorry12 is thus refreshing and important. As 
they explain, people strongly resist apologizing when doing so would run 
counter to their deeply held beliefs. This resistance can be particularly evident 
in group conflicts in which the issues are often unbounded, the groups ill-
defined, and both sides of a conflict often have a viable claim that they deserve 
the apology.13 In such cases, Conner and Jordan rightly suggest that the best 
road to reconciliation may be to skip apology and forgiveness altogether, or to 
at least put them aside for awhile, and to focus instead on acknowledgment and 
cooperation.14 
Conner and Jordan do not account, however, for those who refuse to 
apologize even when they have violated their own belief systems and who make 
no claim to deserve an apology from the other.15 This situation has also received 
scant attention from other legal academics. Nevertheless, it has been 
suggested—without much empirical support—that many otherwise well-
intentioned individuals do not apologize because they fear the apology will be 
used against them in a lawsuit.16 In response, a number of states have in recent 
years adopted legislation intended to encourage apology by disallowing the use 
of apologies as evidence of wrongdoing.17 Other scholars have viewed an 
individual’s refusal to apologize as evidence of his or her faulty character and 
incapacity for remorse.18 So, for example, judges tend to punish criminal 
 
 12. Roger Conner & Patricia Jordan, Never Being Able to Say You’re Sorry: Barriers to Apology by 
Leaders in Group Conflicts, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233 (Spring 2009).  
 13. Of course, apology is also elusive in many dyadic conflicts—where there can also be a 
multitude of issues, where each party has at one point or the other deeply injured the other (divorce 
cases for example) and where the attitude toward apology of each side might also be, “You First.” 
 14. See Conner & Jordan, supra note 12, at 253 (explaining that apologies are not effective unless 
leaders work to soften negative attitudes and to create windows of opportunity to apologize). This 
suggestion seems a reasonable one in the types of group conflicts that Conner and Jordan describe. But 
often conflicts—both group and individual—are reasonably well-bounded and there is an identifiable 
offender and victim. In such cases, skipping the apology might not only be ill-advised, but might also 
make reconciliation impossible. Additionally, in a wide range of public conflicts, the goal of seeking an 
apology is not reconciliation at all, but rather setting the public record straight and thereby restoring 
the public face and dignity of the injured individual or group. In such cases, the demand for an apology 
defines the conflict, and skipping it is not an acceptable option. See White, supra note 9, at 1262–65, 
1272–73, 1295. 
 15. To be fair, Conner and Jordan do not purport to offer an exhaustive account of resistance to 
apology. 
 16. See Orenstein, supra note 8, at 246 (noting people are afraid apologizing will qualify as an 
admission usable in court); Robbennolt, supra note 8, at 465 (noting that fears of apologies establishing 
legal liability discourage people from apologizing) . 
 17. See Cohen, supra note 8, at 820 (noting that, as of 2002, eight states were considering bills that 
would exclude from admissibility apologetic expressions of sympathy); Shuman, supra note 8, at 188 
(discussing Massachusetts evidence rules rendering inadmissible evidence related to “benevolent 
gestures” to show liability in a civil action). 
 18. See Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Pardon My Gaffe: Effects of Sex, Status, and Consequence 
Severity on Accounts, 58 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 611 (1990) ( “[W]hen behaviors deviate 
significantly from witnesses’ assumptions about what most people would do or should do, witnesses are 
more willing to make assumptions about the character or disposition of the actor.”). 
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offenders who refuse to apologize with harsher sentences or, conversely, to 
reward offenders who do apologize with lesser ones.19 
A body of experimental research by psychologists and sociologists suggests, 
however, that explanations for resistance to apology that focus on offender 
remorse and secondary material concerns, such as legal liability, are incomplete 
at best. This socio-psychological research suggests that humans invest 
significant emotional stake in “face”—or their “claimed identity as a competent, 
intelligent, or moral persons”20—and apologize only when they can do so 
without significant “face threat.”21 
This comment briefly considers this research—which seems to have been 
wholly neglected by legal scholars—and offers some preliminary conclusions as 
to what legal academics and practitioners might draw from it. 
II 
OVERVIEW OF THE RESEARCH 
When one social actor injures another, the offense potentially threatens the 
faces of both the offender and the victim.22 First, the offense calls into question 
the offender’s claim to a positive social identity, and, second, the offense 
suggests that the victim is a lesser human being somehow deserving of 
mistreatment.23 Thus, both offender and victim feel lowered self-esteem and 
suffer “face damage.”24 
For this damage to be repaired, the offender must engage in “corrective 
facework,” which typically takes the form of an “account”25— a verbal-remedial 
strategy explaining the victim’s injury.26 Accounts are generally mitigating or 
 
 19. See Bibas & Bierschbach, supra note 8, at 93 n.19 (citing UNITED STATES SENTENCING 
COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1, comment (n.3) (2003)) (authorizing judges to consider 
defendants’ acceptance of responsibility when determining sentences); see also United States v. Fagan, 
162 F.3d 1280, 1284 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The commentary to Section 3E1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines 
also indicates the Commission intended remorse to be a component of acceptance of responsibility.”); 
United States v. Hammick, 36 F.3d 594, 600 (7th Cir. 1994) (affirming a district-court decision to deny 
sentencing reduction because the defendant lacked genuine remorse, evidenced by her incomplete 
explanation of her offense). 
 20. Holley S. Hodgins and Elizabeth Liebeskind, Apology Versus Defense: Antecedents and 
Consequences, 39 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 297, 297 (2003). 
 21. See id. at 297 (explaining that individuals apologize only when apologizing does not pose an 
intolerable face threat). 
 22. See Marti Hope Gonzales et al., Explaining Our Sins: Factors Influencing Offender Accounts 
and Anticipated Victim Responses, 62 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 958, 958 (1992) (noting 
predicaments threaten the face of all interactants). 
 23. See id. (describing how accidents, negligence, and intentional acts affect victims’ and offenders’ 
faces). 
 24. See Holley S. Hodgins et al., Getting Out of Hot Water: Facework in Social Predicaments, 71 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 300, 300 (1996) (noting all parties’ faces are threatened when one 
party fails to observe accepted conventions). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Gonzales et al., supra note 18, at 610. 
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aggravating to victims. An account mitigates to the extent that it ameliorates 
the victim’s face concerns; it aggravates to the extent that it further threatens 
the victim’s face.27 Accounts generally fit into a four-part typology: concessions 
(or apologies), excuses, justifications, or refusals.28 This typology is a continuum, 
with concessions being the most mitigating to victims but the most threatening 
to offenders, and refusals being the most aggravating to victims but the most 
protective of the offender’s own face.29 Victims who receive concessions or valid 
excuses from offenders usually feel better, frequently forgive, and rarely file 
lawsuits. Victims given justifications or refusals often respond with anger. Some 
sue.30 
Perhaps because offenders’ failing to apologize carries a significant risk of 
future harm, studies have demonstrated a “vigorous human preference to 
apologize.”31 Such studies suggest a “shared norm of apologetic discourse as the 
appropriate response when another is harmed.”32 
But this preference for apology has important caveats. Much evidence, for 
example, suggests that “[f]ace needs for the self and others seem to compete, 
and when [one’s] own face threat increases above some [tolerable] 
threshold . . . , [a] defensive motivation [dominates].”33 
Although various factors may increase face threat above this threshold for 
all individuals, on a basic psychological level, individuals have different 
tolerances for face threats.34 Some people “respond defensively at even the 
suggestion of their imperfection, whereas others remain calm” even under harsh 
criticism.35 An individual’s tolerance for face threat corresponds roughly with his 
or her level of inner-directed self-esteem. Individuals with high inner-directed 
self-esteem can more easily acknowledge their flaws because they believe 
fundamentally that they are reasonable and decent people.36 When such people 
apologize, they are merely admitting, in their minds, that they made a mistake, 
 
 27. Id. 
 28. “Concessions take full responsibility without offering extenuating circumstances.” Excuses 
acknowledge harm but “offer qualifying factors that reduce responsibility.” Justifications admit the 
behavior “but seek to redefine the behavior as legitimate.” Refusals deny any responsibility. Id. 
 29. Id.; Gonzales et al., supra note 22, at 959. 
 30. See Shuman, note 8, at 184 (offering empirical evidence that injured patients are dramatically 
less likely to sue when their doctors sincerely apologize). 
 31. Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 312. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 20, at 298. 
 34. See C. Raymond Knee & Miron Zuckerman, A Nondefensive Personality: Autonomy and 
Control as Moderators of Defensive Coping and Self-Handicapping, 32 J. RES. PERSONALITY 115, 125 
(1998) (noting persons with high autonomy-motivation- and low control-motivation orientation 
engaged in less-defensive coping than everyone else). 
 35. Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 20, at 298. 
 36. See Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 118 (citing research that shows people who are self-
determined do not tend to employ avoidant strategies when confronting negative events). 
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which does not threaten their identity.37 In psychological jargon, such 
nondefensive individuals are highly self-determined—or are high on autonomy-
motivation orientation and low on control-motivation orientation.38 
In contrast, some individuals find it nearly impossible to apologize—even 
when they feel terrible about their actions. For these individuals, verbally 
acknowledging they behaved in a hurtful manner makes them hurtful people.39 
Concerned about “feeling weak, incompetent, defeated, guilty, ashamed, 
emotional, [or] like a loser,”40 they use such defensive and self-protective 
“avoidant strategies” as denial or disengagement to “defend the[ir] fragmented 
sel[ves] from personal awareness.”41 Such actions often make them appear 
unremorseful.42 In actuality, however, such individuals are low in self-
determination, or low on autonomy-motivation orientation and high on control-
motivation orientation, which makes apologizing especially difficult—even, and 
especially, when they feel great shame about their actions.43 
Apart from personality differences, however, certain socio-psychological 
factors increase face threat for all individuals, thereby making them less likely 
to apologize. These factors include blameworthiness, reproach-severity, public 
exposure, and relative offender–victim status. 
First, all offenders are less likely to apologize when they are especially 
blameworthy. Some offenses—such as unavoidable accidents—“reveal nothing 
noteworthy about the offenders.”44 In contrast, other offenses—such as sexual 
assault—are “highly diagnostic of the offenders’ defective character.”45 
Individuals who intentionally wrong others are much less likely to apologize 
than those who negligently do so because “undeniably guilty perpetrators [of 
intentional wrongful acts] cannot claim positive social identity.”46 Thus, they 
 
 37. See ENGEL, supra note 4, at 48 (noting those with healthy self-esteem bounce back quickly 
from remorse or shame). 
 38. See Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 116. Autonomy orientation refers to the tendency to 
initiate behavior out of choices based on an awareness of one’s needs, feelings, and integrated goals.” 
Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 301. “[C]ontrol orientation describes the tendency to seek out external 
controls and experience events as pressures that determine behavior and feelings.” Id. 
 39. AARON LAZARE, ON APOLOGY 163 (2004). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 118 “Denial involves denying that the event is occurring, 
behavioral disengagement involves ceasing to try to deal with the event, and mental disengagement 
involves immersing oneself in other activities to avoid thinking about the event.” Id. at 119. 
 42. See ENGEL, supra note 4, at 48 (noting that people with low self-esteem may rapidly put up 
emotional walls “of steel” that make them appear unaffected by the pain of those they hurt). 
 43. See Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 117–19 (noting that self-determined individuals will 
stray away from using strategies that deny negative, self-actualization events). Every human has “both 
autonomy and control motivation orientations.” Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 20, at 299. 
Individual differences in defensiveness “are a function of differing strengths of these two orientations.” 
Id. But the “use of defensive attributions” to some degree characterizes everyone, except perhaps those 
few with “optimal psychological development.” Knee & Zuckerman, supra note 34, at 117. 
 44. Gonzales et al., supra note 22, at 958. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 301. 
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often “feel especially threatened and provide defensive, self-protective 
accounts” rather than suffer further loss of face by apologizing.47 
Additionally, offenders who are harshly reproached, whether by victims or 
others, are less likely to acknowledge wrongdoing than those given the 
opportunity to apologize of their own accord. This is because severe reproach 
directly challenges the offender’s behavior and squarely calls into question the 
offender’s social identity.48 “When victims deliver scathing reproaches, 
perpetrators may experience face threat beyond the taint of their own ill 
behavior. An apology that might have been given freely by a perpetrator willing 
to acknowledge ineptitude comes more difficult after being labeled a cad or a 
louse.”49 Alternatively, a gentle rebuke that conveys belief in the offender’s 
inherent goodness may enable him “to respond from the protective orientation, 
offer mitigation for the victim’s face threat, and provide the best hope for 
reconciliation.”50 
Under this “symbolic interactions” framework, a victim who severely 
reproaches an offender and so ignores her “face needs” will likely receive “an 
aggravating account.” This will lead to the victim’s own “harsh evaluation” and 
further reproach.51 “[A]t each phase, one person’s lack of facework for the other 
escalates conflict and decreases the likelihood of [apology and] forgiveness.”52 
Paradoxically, though apologies are especially critical for victims of 
intentionally grievous acts, offenders who commit such acts are the least likely 
to willingly express contrition—leading to severe victim reproach, further 
defensiveness, and further escalation of the conflict.53 
Relatedly, when grievous acts unfold in the public domain, victims often feel 
they need an apology to restore their public face and are thus more likely to 
issue a severe public reproach.54 Yet a transgressor who is publically reproached 
suffers collective judgment, and a public apology risks leaving them naked, 
defenseless, and open to the multitude’s scrutiny.55 The “movement from 
 
 47. Id. Offenders who are highly culpable often resort instead to “extreme” accounting strategies. 
Id. One study found that in the face of having committed blameworthy acts, approximately one-third of 
individuals told “outright fabrications.” Id. at 308. However, despite its prevalence, lying is a 
particularly hazardous strategy for refusing responsibility because if exposed it becomes “extremely 
difficult for liars to restore face.” Id. Thus, having lied, offenders become even less likely to come clean 
and apologize. Id. 
 48. See id. (noting that an apology is harder to give after the offender has been negatively labeled). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Hodgins & Liebeskind, supra note 20, at 313. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 311 (noting that high-blame offenders took defensive postures 
because they “envisioned negative repercussions of predicaments for future relationships with 
victims”). 
 54. Id. 
 55. NICHOLAS TAVUCHIS, MEA CULPA: A SOCIOLOGY OF APOLOGY AND RECONCILIATION 70 
(1991). 
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private to public thus radically alters the interaction,” increases the offender’s 
face threat, and leaves less “discursive space” for apology or forgiveness.56 
Finally, whether the offense is public or private, offenders are more likely to 
apologize to high-status victims than to low-status ones.57 Offenders “expend 
more effort to preserve relationships with high-status victims” because high-
status victims “have social power and control potentially important outcomes.”58 
On the other hand, high-status offenders have little incentive to attend to low-
status victims’ face needs. Indeed, a victim’s low status likely played a role in an 
offender’s decision to inflict harm in the first place. In such situations, the 
victim’s and offender’s relative social status may be the decisive factor in 
whether the offender apologizes.59 
III 
CONCLUSIONS 
The above research on the role of face concern in offender willingness to 
apologize offers several lessons to legal scholars and practitioners. 
First, criminal offenders, many of whom are likely to be low on self-
determination, may resist apology to victims out of psychological fragility and 
the psychological need to preserve face rather than lack of remorse. Thus, the 
criminal-justice system should be cautious about punishing offenders more 
harshly because they fail to show external remorse—or even when they are 
openly defiant. This caution should be exercised whether the system explicitly 
punishes offenders more harshly—for example, as Professor O’Hara advocates, 
by giving victims power to extend offender’s sentences for not apologizing60—or 
implicitly, by giving lighter sentences to those who publicly apologize. Such 
practices not only risk unfairness in the treatment of equally remorseful 
offenders but also effectively coerce apologies—which, because they are 
involuntary, are unlikely to promote healthy psychological growth among 
offenders and may instead elevate an offender’s psychological resistance toward 
accepting responsibility. 
Second, because highly blameworthy offenders resist apologizing primarily 
to preserve face, statutes excluding apologies from evidence in order to 
encourage private apologies are unlikely to increase the incidence of apology 
when offenders are grossly negligent or reckless or intentionally harm another. 
For example, although statutes excluding apologies from evidence may 
 
 56. Id. at 70. 
 57. See Gonzales et al., supra note 18, at 619 (noting offenders are less concerned with the faces of 
low-status victims); Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 303 (noting offenders should expend more effort to 
preserve relationships with high-status victims). 
 58. Hodgins et al., supra note 24, at 302–03. 
 59. Id. at 313. 
 60. See Erin Ann O’Hara & Maria Mayo Robbins, Using Criminal Punishment to Serve Both 
Victim and Social Needs, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 208 (Spring 2009) (proposing portions of 
sentence terms be enforced at the victim’s option). 
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encourage doctors to apologize when negative medical outcomes were beyond 
their control, these statutes may have little effect when the doctor was grossly 
incompetent or reckless or provided care below widely accepted standards. In 
such cases, apologizing would call into question the doctor’s identity as a 
competent and caring professional—a claimed identity that is likely central to 
his sense of self and also to his standing in the medical community. From a 
socio-psychological standpoint, denial rather than apology may be the better 
strategy.61 In other words, most doctors will find it more beneficial to claim a 
valid lawsuit is groundless (thereby benefiting from the popular animosity 
toward “frivolous” lawsuits), than to lose face by admitting to medical 
malpractice. 
Third, because harsh reproach increases offender face threat and thus 
decreases the likelihood that the offender will apologize, legal practitioners who 
represent victims who ultimately desire a sincere apology and reconciliation 
should reproach offenders in a manner that conveys an underlying belief in the 
offender’s inherent goodness. It is also preferable, when possible, to issue 
reproach in private rather than in public. 
Finally, because high-status offenders are unlikely to apologize to low-status 
victims, particularly when reproached publically, government officials are 
unlikely to voluntarily apologize when they injure marginalized groups or 
individuals. Thus, although forced apology may be ineffective in changing 
individual behavior, courts should consider ordering government officials to 
apologize when a public apology is necessary to set the public record straight or 
to restore the dignity of the injured person or group.62 
 
 
 61. See Gonzales et al., supra note 18, at 619 (“[T]ransgressors who knowingly and willingly violate 
widely held norms . . . have relatively more to lose by accepting full or partial responsibility for a 
predicament and acknowledging the accuracy of victims’ interpretations and their right to issue 
reproaches.”). 
 62. Public apologies, unlike private interpersonal apologies, serve an essential function in defining 
both social reality and official truth. See TAVUCHIS, supra note 55, at 71 (noting that the overriding 
interest in public apology is, “to put the apology ‘on record,’ that is, to extract a public, chronicled 
recantation that restores those aspects of the collectivity’s [or individual’s] integrity and honor called 
into question by the offense.”). 
